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Abstrac:t Scenarios are frequently used within techniques for 
planning and designing systems.  They are an especially 
helpful means of visualizing and understanding the 
incorporation of new systems within systems of systems.  If 
used as the basis for decisions about candidate designs, then 
it is important that such decisions can be rationalized and 
quantitative assessment is particularly important.  In this 
paper, an approach for developing complex scenarios, which 
incorporates the phases of systems development and 
deployment, is presented and a quantitative method of 
comparison is described. This approach is based on the 
development of measures of merit and measures of 
performance. The techniques are illustrated using cases that 
are relevant to Network Enabled Capability. 
 
Keywords: Scenario based Design, Architectural Evaluation, 
Capability Assessment. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
NDERSTANDING stakeholders’ requirements is critical 
to the success of every system development [1]. Scenario-
based design is one of a number of techniques that can be 
used to elicit requirements [2]. Similarly, scenarios also play a 
pivotal role in a number of architectural validation methods 
associated with the process of testing architectures [3]. 
Scenarios can provide a personalized, fictional story with 
characters, events, products and environments through which 
stakeholders can engage in the design process [4]. They also 
provide system designers with a method to explore ideas and 
identify the potential ramifications of specific design 
decisions. The underlying purpose of the scenario approach is 
to identify likely outcomes to generic circumstances using 
realistic situations.  
Network Enabled Capability (NEC) is the endeavor to 
enhance [military] capability through the networking of 
existing and future military assets in order to respond to the 
rapidly changing conflict environment in which the armed 
forces must operate [5]. Capability is the ability to achieve a 
particular military effect in a specific context. NEC requires 
the integration of independent components, systems, and 
networks that can evolve and operate in a collaborative and 
dependable manner. NEC makes demands on the system 
design that cannot be fulfilled by traditional system 
engineering design principles [6], because systems no longer 
operate in isolation. NEC will be realized through networks of 
systems of systems that are dynamic, large-scale and subject 
to continual change and evolution. 
This paper describes our experience of using scenarios in 
the context of NEC research. Section II outlines the use of 
scenario-based design as a method to demonstrate research 
and engage stakeholders. Section III outlines a scenario-based 
architectural evaluation framework for the evaluation of 
candidate architectures and how scenarios can be used to 
develop a set of measures. Section IV sets out a discussion 
upon the successes, failures and limitations of the approach, 
whilst Section V draws together conclusions and outlines 
future work. 
II. SCENARIO-BASED DESIGN 
Between 2005 and 2009 a multi-institution, multi-
disciplinary research programme (NECTISE) developed 
systems engineering approaches to better manage systems for 
NEC.  The programme had a wide scope that included 
research into high-level architectural approaches, through-life 
systems management and design decision making, through to 
specific technological approaches for managing multiple, co-
operative UAVs in NEC environments.  A major challenge 
was to create a demonstration (to stakeholders) that integrated 
the research across these wide-ranging themes. 
The stakeholders included government, military, industrial 
and academic communities working in the maritime, air, and 
land domains, together with the wider systems engineering 
community. There were, thus, multiple perspectives to be 
accommodated within a single demonstration event and a 
carefully crafted scenario was required in order to show the 
research benefits to this diverse range of organizations and 
people. 
The scenario-based approach was selected primarily 
because the storyboard nature would allow stakeholders of 
varying knowledge in engineering and areas of expertise to 
appreciate the contextualized application of the research. 
Carroll [7] states that scenarios can provide sufficient data, 
information and context to paint a picture that is wholly 
believable and real enough to be considered viable for 
experimentation and analysis.  
This provides a foundation against which stakeholders can 
explore the benefits of the research being presented and how it 
can potentially provide value and future advancement in their 
specific domains and business. The aim was to therefore 
create a scenario that satisfied a number of key criteria: 
• Include multiple stakeholders’ requirements and multiple 
timeframes. 
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• Be representative of NEC and its implications for battle 
space, the defense industry, UK Ministry of Defence 
(MoD) and the associated research activities in the 
programme 
• Be sufficiently straight forward to be easily understood by 
non-experts, but at the same time sufficiently rich to be 
informative to domain experts. 
• Enable the demonstration of multi-disciplinary research 
outputs. 
Following assessment of scenario writing tools and 
techniques, two were selected as most appropriate for the level 
of complexity required by the NECTISE programme. The first 
was The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP) Guide for 
Understanding and Implementing Defense Experimentation 
(GUIDEx) [8], and the second was the Whitworth, et. al. [9] 
framework for checking the relevance of scenarios to 
applications under consideration. The starting point for the 
scenario was to formally assess and consider the main 
NECTISE project requirements. These set the basic aims and 
objectives for the scenario to enable its development to fully 
represent the range of stakeholders’ needs. The scenario was 
developed in an iterative fashion. Requirements were taken 
from customers (i.e. industry and government) and academics, 
in terms of research to be demonstrated. Locating research 
themes within the initial scenario was an important first step. 
Business experts were invited to assess progress regularly 
(monthly) and verify the content of the scenario against 
business requirements. Once the scenario had reached an 
initial level of maturity, a formal two-day workshop was 
convened with all of the researchers and academics, along 
with business experts from BAE Systems, and invited guests 
from academia, industry, and UK MoD. The outputs of the 
workshop were the main concepts and storylines for the 
scenario. Through a series of stakeholder forums and formal 
design reviews, a stable scenario that incorporated the wide 
ranging timescales, disciplines, and business objectives was 
created. Further details of the stakeholder engagement are 
described in [10] [11].  
The basis of the NECTISE scenario is that of a foreign state 
threatening international airspace with a surface-to-air missile 
(SAM) weapon system. The operational mission is to 
neutralize the SAM site to reduce the threat issued against 
civil air activity. The scenario is composed of four interlinked 
vignettes, each representing a particular stage of capability 
development and/or use, and each representing a different 
timeframe. The main question concerns the development of 
military capability from inception and planning at the 
government level, development and assessment within 
industry, through to use by the military in the operational 
environment. The capability change in question is an 
incremental increase in surveillance system capability for 
monitoring no-fly zones. The four interlinked vignettes are as 
follows. 
• Vignette 4 represents capability planning. At this level, 
the decisions are taken by the UK MoD with industry 
having a supporting role. Systems engineering approaches 
applied are those through which industry can support the 
UK MoD’s capability planning framework. Typically the 
timeframe for this level is measured in years. 
• Vignette 3 is the capability development stage where 
decisions are made about capability change including the 
development of options, selection, and change plans. This 
is applicable to industry and the UK MoD. Typically the 
timeframe for this is from months to years. 
• Vignette 2 looks at the deployment of new, changed, or 
updated capability. Again, this is applicable to both 
industry and the UK MoD. The timeframe for this 
vignette is measured in weeks to months. 
• Vignette 1 is concerned with a military operation. 
Although focused on military needs, this vignette is 
relevant to industry through identification of systems 
agility requirements. The timeframe here is hours and 
minutes.  
 
The purpose for which this scenario was developed was to 
host research solutions within a viable and realistic context; 
the purpose is not to show a consolidated solution to the whole 
scenario. Having outlined how scenario-based design was 
used to engage a variety of stakeholders in the NECTISE 
project we now consider the role of scenarios in the 
identification of measurements for architectural-level 
validation. 
An important output of the two-day stakeholder workshop 
was a set of NEC-readiness themes, derived through a mini-
Delphi technique [12] [13] and illuminated through discussion 
within the multi-disciplinary environment.  The NEC-
readiness themes [14] are essentially cross-cutting themes 
through the entire research programme and constitute the key 
parameters that must be managed in order to achieve NEC-
readiness, i.e. design of systems that are NEC-ready.  The 
themes are: Agility, Interoperability, Dependability, 
Affordability, Availability, Collaboration, and Knowledge 
Management (Fig.1).  Every research output in the program 
could be described in terms of these themes, or combinations 
thereof, and these provided a basis upon which to architect 
both the scenario and the research outputs within it.  Agility is 
at the centre, because this is the objective of NEC; the 
interrelated themes must be improved through better systems 
engineering to enable agility. 
 
 
Fig. 1.  NEC Themes showing their interrelationships. 
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Better understanding of NEC (i.e. how architecture affects 
capability during the design, development, deployment and 
evolution of NEC ready systems) may be derived from an 
evaluation of how different architectures perform.  The 
organisation of the NEC-readiness themes provides a route to 
formal evaluation of architecture.  The themes were represented 
in MODAF (MoD Architecture Framework).  Table I lists the 
relevant MODAF views for the NEC-readiness themes, but also 
notes the extent to which the themes may be represented in 
MODAF. 
 
CSF Summary MODAF View 
Interoperability Well covered. Many 
Views focus on 
Interoperability between 
Organizations and 
Systems. 
OV-2, OV-3, 
OV-4, OV-5, 
OV-5, OV-7; 
SV-1, SV-2, 
SV-3, SV-4, 
SV-6; TV-1; 
SOV-2, SOV-
4c.  
Agility Several views show how 
Capability, Systems and 
Standards will progress 
over time.  
StV-3; OV-6; 
SV-8, SV-9, 
SV-10; AcV-1, 
AcV-2; TV-2; 
SOV-3, SOV-
5.  
Dependability Dependability 
parameters are not 
included in MODAF but 
can be added to existing 
elements.  
StV-2; OV-1c, 
OV-5; SV-4, 
SV-7, SV-12; 
SOV-4a.  
Knowledge The MODAF Integrated 
Dictionary contains the 
knowledge of the 
Architecture. Various 
Views provide the 
knowledge of the 
Operational and System 
and Data Models identify 
how knowledge of the 
actual operation will be 
stored.  
AV-2; StV-1, 
StV-2, StV-3, 
StV-4; OV-7; 
SV-9, SV-11; 
TV-1, TV-2; 
SOV-1.  
Collaboration MODAF has some views 
that cover human 
collaboration and the 
proposed Human Views 
provide further support.  
StV-5; OV-4; 
SV-7; TV-1; 
HV-A, HV-C, 
HV-D, HVE, 
HV-F, HV-G.  
Affordability Not really covered as 
Cost and Budgets do not 
exist within MODAF.  
AV-1; OV-5; 
SV-1.  
Table 1.Mapping of NEC Theme aspects against MODAF framework 
elements. 
III. SCENARIO-BASED ARCHITECTURE EVALUATION 
Clements, Kazman, and Klien [15] argue that successful 
system development and evolution is dependent on making 
informed decisions at the architectural level. Architecture 
evaluation is designed to analyze a candidate architecture in 
order to identify potential risks and to verify that the quality 
requirements have been addressed in the design [16].  
Quality attributes are non-functional requirements of a 
component or a system. The ISO 9126 quality model provides 
a structured set of characteristics including functionality, 
reliability, usability, efficiency, maintainability, and 
portability against which an architecture can be judged [17]. 
Each high-level characteristic contains a set of sub-
characteristics. For example, reliability contains a set of 
attributes that are related to the capability of software to 
maintain its specified level of performance under stated 
conditions for a stated period of time including maturity, 
recoverability, and fault tolerance. Each quality sub-
characteristic is further divided into entities, which can be 
verified or measured.  
Key quality attributes within NECTISE included agility, 
dependability, availability, and interoperability. Specific 
military quality attributes include survivability and lethality. 
Survivability in this context is concerned with the ability to 
remain mission capable after a single engagement. Similar to 
the high level attributes such as dependability, it is a 
composite attribute that can be measured by susceptibility i.e. 
the likelihood of being detected, identified, and hit; 
vulnerability i.e. the effects of being hit by a weapon; 
recoverability i.e. long term post hit effects, damage control 
and firefighting, capability restoration or (in extremis) escape 
and evacuation. Lethality is the effectiveness of a weapon 
system in all environments against the full spectrum of 
battlefield threats and measured by the enumeration of 
survivors after exposure. 
A number of scenario-based architectural evaluation 
methods exist which provide a structured approach to 
evaluating how well an architecture meets stakeholders’ 
requirements in terms of the quality attributes that the 
architecture exhibits. The key concept underpinning these 
methods is a set of scenarios that are important to stakeholders 
and allow the systems properties to be estimated [18]. 
However, they differ significantly in their focus and the 
number of attributes employed. For example, while the 
Software Architecture Assessment Method (SAAM) [19] and 
its variants focus on singular quality attributes such as 
modifiability, flexibility, evolution and reusability other 
methods such as the Architecture Tradeoff Analysis Method 
(ATAM) [20], Scenario-Based Architecture Reengineering 
(SBAR) [21] and the Software Architecture Evaluation Model 
(SAEM) [22] include multiple attributes which contribute to a 
better understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
overall architecture and its constituent parts. The selection of 
the most appropriate methods is dependent on the context in 
which the architecture is being evaluated and the quality 
attributes being addressed [16]. 
In contrast, Webster, Looker, Russell, Liu, and Xu [23] 
proposed an architectural evaluation framework (AEF) for 
NEC that utilizes scenarios in order to understand how to 
achieve service integration for military capability (see Fig.2). 
The framework is built on two measures derived from 
NATO’s Measures of Merit (MoM): Measures of Performance 
(MoP) and Measures of Effectiveness (MoE). MoP verify an 
individual system against its service specification [6]. The 
MoP are independent of an operational scenario and allow the 
results to be compared with systems that provide the same 
functionality. In contrast, MoE are dependent on an 
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operational scenario. They provide a measurement of how 
well a system accomplishes its assigned tasks within an 
operational context and provides a level of confidence in the 
capability. The formulation of MoE is dependent on a 
stakeholder’s viewpoint and influenced by the mission or task. 
Here we can distinguish between the terms measures and 
metrics. Metrics are a system of measurement through which 
the merits of an entity can be assessed and measures may 
contribute to a metric as a set of quantitative values within the 
system. The separation of MoE and MoP allows a decoupling 
between a conceptual definition of a capability and a physical 
resource.  
 
Fig. 2.  Architectural Evaluation Framework  
 
Development of the AEF focused on demonstrating how it 
can be utilized to derive a set of NEC Measures of 
Effectiveness. A number of scenarios were considered from 
the perspective of Land and Maritime operational examples: 
cruise and ballistic missile defence, a time critical target 
(TCT), and a fire support system (FSS).  
In a cruise and ballistic missile defense scenario [24], a 
small nation island is threatened by large hostile neighbor 
nation intent on annexing the island. The island’s strategic 
objective is to maintain air superiority over its contiguous 
waters to the limits of its SAM envelope, to protect Sea Line 
of Communication (SLOC) and Air Line of Communication 
until a coalition of friendly forces arrives. Friendly forces, in 
the shape of two battleships, are positioned to assist the island 
improve its defense posture against enemy missile attacks. As 
a result, the battleships also become targets and are prepared 
to defend against hostiles. In this scenario, there are two 
competing missions: prevent enemy ballistic missiles from 
destroying key allied infrastructure targets, and defend against 
cruise and ballistic missile attacks. The MoE that can be 
derived from this scenario are the fraction of the critical 
infrastructure targets that survive the attacks and the fraction 
of the battleships that survive the attack. In the later case these 
can be expressed mathematically as the mean number of ships 
surviving (1) and the cumulative ballistic missile leaks (2). 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
In a TCT scenario [24], an attack submarine that was 
threatening SLOC was killed and a Kilo class submarine is 
ordered to replace the destroyed submarine. While the time of 
departure cannot be determined, intelligence confirms the Kilo 
is preparing for sea. The mission objective is to kill the Kilo 
on the surface as it emerges from port before it can become a 
threat. On a separate mission an ISR (Intelligence Surveillance 
Reconnaissance) submarine has been deployed near the area 
of interest. The ideal solution is vectoring an F18 to kill the 
Kilo with a Standoff Land- Attack Missile-Extended Response 
missile. However, the ISR submarine can be employed to 
initiate the kill if necessary although this is not considered the 
optimal solution. The decision on which platform to select is 
dependent on the decision maker’s ability to assess the time 
available for them to pursue the airborne option expressed as 
the time on target. Here we can consider the effects of latency 
in order to make an informed decision (3). 
 
 (3) 
 
In a fire support system (FSS) scenario [25], a hostile force is 
threatening a critical node of a Command, Control and 
Communication (C3) system. The three main elements in the 
FSS at the battalion level include: the forward observer (FO), 
the battalion fire direction centre (BFDC), and the field 
artillery cannon (FAC). The FO receives the initial stimulus 
by detecting an enemy threat and communicates estimates of 
the position and velocity of the target, and requests for fire to 
the BFDC central computer. Each FAC has a receive-only 
battery display unit (BDU) linked with the C3 which assists 
execution of fire plans by receiving and printing firing data for 
each target that the battery will execute. An enemy tank 
appears in the field of vision of the FO. The mission is to 
prevent the tank from attacking the node. The batteries cannot 
[physically] see the threat and fire according to the directions 
that are provided by FO data. In this scenario it is assumed 
that the threat cannot attack the FAC directly and that it will 
continue to pursue its mission even when fired upon. In 
addition, the time interval cannot be considered in isolation to 
yield a MoE but should be considered alongside the doctrine 
that is feasible at the specific time interval e.g. Look- Shoot-
Shoot (LSS) and Look-Shoot-Look-Shoot (LSLS). In this 
scenario, the MoE is the probability that the node will be 
defended successfully expressed as the overall probability of 
kill (OPK) in a given time window where the OPK measures 
the capability of the FSS to stop the threat and can be 
computed from the single-shot probability of kill. Our initial 
work on the development of the AEF suggests that scenarios 
can be used to derive a set of MoE that would allow reasoning 
at an architectural-level. However, access to real military 
scenarios or expertise to develop them is strictly limited due to 
security restrictions. Nevertheless, it demonstrates that 
military personnel could use the AEF to identify 
measurements from scenarios for architectural-level 
validation. 
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IV. DISCUSSION 
With the nature of military operations becoming ever more 
collaborative, there is a requirement for more interoperable 
and NEC capable systems that allow those forces to work 
together more effectively to better achieve planned missions 
and goals within theatre. But what is the best way to 
understand, measure, and assess how these NEC ready 
systems will perform, and what long-term acquisition and 
planning decisions should be made to accommodate such 
systems? One way is to apply a scenario-based design process 
to create viable situations and contexts. This allows the issues 
to be explored and assessed; from this an understanding can be 
gained about the appropriate choices to be made for a given 
scenario, the systems involved and the possible outcomes. The 
way in which the scenario based design technique becomes 
relevant for the assessment of NEC has been through the 
application of the NEC themes. When creating or building a 
scenario, each aspect of the themes can be represented within 
it. This means that it can be assessed and measured against, for 
example, interoperability, agility or dependability. These 
themes in turn link directly to MODAF meaning that scenarios 
can thus be used to assess architectural frameworks for 
elements of risk, measures of merit and performance. 
The work accomplished within the NECTISE research 
programme has brought about the mapping of the MODAF 
viewpoints to the relative NEC themes (see table 1). Such a 
relationship map allows scenarios and vignettes to be assessed 
against the criteria within each respective MODAF viewpoint, 
thereby bringing about the ability to evaluate capability for 
legacy, current and proposed systems against a context. Add to 
this the ability to apply the AEF and it provides a new way in 
which capability and architecture can be evaluated so as to 
meet stakeholder needs. This is illustrated in fig.3 which 
shows the interaction between the NECTISE scenario 
vignettes, the NEC themes and MODAF. 
 
 
Fig. 3.  Using scenarios for capability assessment.  
 
It must be noted that whilst this paper has focused on a 
NEC specific approach to scenario development and 
assessment, it is perfectly feasible to apply such an approach 
and method to non-NEC aspects for understanding stakeholder 
requirements and capability evaluation. 
 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Scenarios provide an important means through which 
proposed systems may be assessed prior to development or 
deployment, but decisions about the best architectures to 
provide solutions requires quantitative evaluation.  The 
approach described herein provides such a quantitative 
assessment method.  In summary, a stakeholder engagement 
plan is developed through which a composite scenario is 
developed.  The scenario is composed of vignettes that 
contextualize the principal phases of systems development to 
meet a capability need.  One or more ‘operational’ vignettes 
must be included to test the deployed system.  The system 
attributes are described through an appropriate set of ‘ilities 
that provide linkage from one vignette to the next.  An 
assessment framework based on measures of Merit and 
Measures of Performance has been described, through which 
candidate architectures can be quantitatively compared, thus 
providing a rational basis upon which to make technical 
decisions about solution systems to support capabilities. 
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